The earnings management and its impact on investment decision making in capital assets by Moradi, Zohre & Nassir Zadeh, Farzaneh
European Online Journal of Natural and Social Sciences; vol.2, No. 3 (s), pp. 1553-1558
European Online Journal of Natural and Social Sciences 2013;
ISSN 1805-3602
www.european-science.com 
1553 
vol.2, No.3 (s), pp. 1553-1558
Copyright © Zohre Moradi and Farzaneh Nassir Zadeh, 2013
The earnings management and its impact on investment 
decision making in capital assets
Zohre Moradi, Farzaneh Nassir Zadeh
Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ferdowsi University, Mashhad. Iran
 Abstract
Given that the conducted studies about earn-
ings management have dealt with the effect of earn-
ings management on investment decisions made by 
enterprises so the current article is mainly intended 
to review of the studies regarding earnings manage-
ment as well as quality of the impact by earnings 
management on corporative decision making for 
investment. In this essay, investment decision mak-
ing means those decisions, which are related to in-
vestment in corporative capital assets. The results of 
the conducted studies indicate that earnings man-
agement may affect on efficiency of investment in 
capital assets and this leads to making inefficient 
and inappropriate decisions. 
Keywords: Over-Investment, Capital Assets, 
Investment Efficiency, Earnings Management 
 Introduction 
According to users’ view of financial state-
ments, particularly investors, determining net profit 
is one of the paramount aspects of financial report-
ing in joint stock companies for which from attitude 
of board of directors and shareholders, net profit is 
a criterion for evaluation of management’s efficien-
cy in any institution. Alternately, market value per 
share and profit of any stock depend on rate of net 
profit and profitability trend in joint stock compa-
nies for long years. The annual increase in profit 
for joint stock companies make shareholders sure 
and attract the new investors to purchase corpora-
tive stocks and it will encourage banks and other 
credit foundations to give loans further (Ravanshad 
and Talebnia, 2010). 
Through presentation of income statement, 
the commercial units purpose the important in-
formation about the financial performance of the 
commercial unit. The net profit and loss is the im-
portant figure that users of financial statements 
employ in making financial decisions. Usually, in-
vestors play special attention to figure of the report-
ed profit (as one of the important factors in deci-
sion making). As a result, directors may manage it 
to increase value of their shares. Thus, due to the 
importance of the reported profit, earnings man-
agement has been the subject for many studies dur-
ing several decades. 
On the other hand, presentation of unreal in-
formation may adversely affect on decisions made 
by users of the financial statements and lead them 
to make inappropriate decisions. 
Theoretical framework and review of 
literature
The increasing spread of economic activities 
and their ever- growing complexity on the one hand 
and necessity of paying attention to accounting ac-
curate information and financial reporting on the 
other hand has lead to creating important institu-
tional changes in accounting thoughts and theories 
as well as modern analytical and managerial meth-
ods in accounting. Further focus and paying at-
tention to income statement is one of the foremost 
changes of this kind (Mollanazari and Karimi-
zand, 2007). 
One of the paramount evaluation criteria for 
performance and determining the value of eco-
nomic enterprise is the reported profit in financial 
statements that have been always adapted by users 
like shareholders and investors etc. since several ap-
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proximation techniques may be employed to calcu-
late profit (earnings) in accounting so computation 
of an economic enterprise is influenced by approxi-
mation methods in accounting. Management of an 
enterprise is responsible for preparation of finan-
cial statements (Hemati  and  Poorheidari, 2004). 
When enterprises are under the pressure of adverse 
economic conditions, their managers ask for ac-
counting division to improve the last row of finan-
cial statements namely profit and thereby change 
their information content. Despite of all its flexi-
bility, it does not seem that accounting can provide 
the useful data for management under such circum-
stances. Earnings management is one of the tech-
niques, which are used sometimes for arrangement 
of presentation of information regarding corpora-
tive favorable status. Earning management denotes 
general intervention by management in process of 
determining profit, which is often in line with the 
managerial arbitrary goals(Taghavi et al, 2010).
As usual, investors pay special attention to fig-
ure of the reported profit (as one of the important 
factors in decisions making). As a result, directors 
may tend to manage earnings to increase value of 
their own stocks. For this reason, due to impor-
tance of the reported profit, earnings management 
is the subject for many researches during the recent 
decades. 
Studies have shown low fluctuation and stabil-
ity of profit signify their quality so that investors 
may tend to invest in stocks for the enterprises with 
more confidence since they have profit trend with 
more stability. Thus in this course, earnings man-
agement may be considered as a method to arrange 
for communication and favorable financial status 
of enterprises that done by management interven-
tion in process of determining profit(Noravesh and 
Hosseini, 2009).    
As a process for taking deliberative steps with-
in the limits of accounting agreed principles, earn-
ings management has been defined to approach the 
reported profit to the given level so this measure is 
done in order to approach the reported profit to the 
level of target earnings through manipulation in ac-
counting (Mollanazari and  Karimizand, 2007).
Earning management is done when managers 
change in financial reporting by means of judgment 
in financial reporting and structures of transactions 
for the sake of interests of beneficiaries (including 
shareholders, creditors, personnel, government, 
and investors etc) regarding corporative economic 
performance or under the influence of implemen-
tation of arbitrary results, which depend on the re-
ported accounting records(Hemati and Poorhe-
idari, 2004). 
Schipper K. (1989) expresses earnings manage-
ment as purposeful intervention in process of exter-
nal financial reporting in order to acquire personal 
benefit. He immediately adds that the more com-
prehensive definition of earnings management cov-
ers the real earnings management which has been 
created by decision about investment schedule or 
decisions about financial provision to change the 
reported profit or also some of its elements. 
De George F. et al (1999) define earnings 
management a type of artificial manipulation on 
the expected level of profit for some certain deci-
sions (including predication of analysts and or ap-
proximation of previous profits trend for prediction 
of future earnings). According to their view, the 
main motive for earnings management is in fact to 
manage investors’ image of the given commercial 
unit(Bazzazzadeh and Dehghan, 2011). According 
to Paul M. Healy and J.M Wahlen (1999), earnings 
management occurs when managers employ their 
personal judgments in financial reporting and ma-
nipulate structure of transaction toward changing 
of financial reporting. This action is done either in 
order to mislead some shareholders and investors 
regarding corporative economic performance or by 
aiming at affecting on results of the contracts which 
their conclusion is subjected acquisition of certain 
profit. But Scott (1997) refers to earnings manage-
ment as power of an enterprise in taking account-
ing policies to achieve some of manager’s certain 
objectives(Namazi et al, 2011). 
From Whild et al (2001) view, earnings man-
agement denotes the management’s general in-
tervention in process of determining profit that is 
often in parallel with managerial arbitrary goals 
(Khajavi et al, 2011).    
With respect to the conducted studies in the 
field of accounting literature, Stolowy and Ber-
ton (2004) divided it into three classes of earnings 
management, profit smoothing, and reporting from 
accumulation of negative items by their classifica-
tion that respectively overlap the goals of affecting 
on profit level per share, reducing profit dispersion 
per share, and reduced profit per current share in 
order to increase profit for the future share at the 
lower level to each other(Modares et al 2009). 
The circle of earnings management is beyond 
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manipulation of reporting techniques and it also 
covers even manipulation of real activities (e.g. in-
crease production level and inventories for reduc-
tion of the final cost of the sold goods)( Nikooma-
ram et al ,2009). 
Earnings management purposes and motives
There are many possible reasons for earnings 
management. With respect to the importance of 
profit and its high information content, the man-
agers always try to follow up it in line with certain 
goals and manipulate the amount of reported prof-
it while the presence of earnings management has 
drawn highly attention in many researches and rec-
ognition of certain motives in earnings manage-
ment seems essential to discover and prevent from 
such behaviors. 
Fields et al (2001) explain how several motives 
usually predict identical behaviors from earnings 
management since disclosure of the related inter-
ventions of certain motives encounter with problem 
in many behavioral studies. In addition to the exist-
ing constraints, the other problem is to distinguish 
behaviors of earnings management from other ef-
fects of financial reporting.  
Kellog and Kellog (1991) define two motives 
for earnings management: encouraging investors to 
purchase corporative stocks and increasing market 
value for the given enterprise. Dye (1991) states that 
earnings management usually is derived from ben-
efitting of managers from advantages of informa-
tion dissymmetry and has purposed two important 
points. First, profit is manipulated to increase bo-
nus for managers; and at the second, the practical 
investors like that the market to adapt better corpo-
rative value(Khajavi et al, 2011).
The existing behaviors of managers for earnings 
management for its positive impacts on corporative 
share price indicates that strong motives for rising 
stocks price or attract of more investors logically in-
crease earnings management. 
Managers have some motives concerning to 
earnings management that they can be implied as 
follows: 
1. Receiving managerial bonuses 
It seems that if management’s bonus is paid 
based on one of the performance criteria (such as 
accounting profit) the manager will try to adapt ac-
counting techniques to increase profit and thus his/ 
her bonus. 
2. Reducing political cost 
Since size and magnitude of an enterprise 
serves as parameter for its political repute and hon-
or so it is predicted that compared to small busi-
nesses, the large enterprises more likely adapt those 
accounting techniques, which reflect lower profit. 
Accordingly, it is assumed that if the account par-
ty for contract with the enterprise knows that ac-
counting profit (earnings) shows exclusive propri-
etorship of owner for the profit thus such awareness 
may create heavy burden for the given enterprise. 
Therefore, if managers of enterprises feel that they 
are center of notice in this trend, they have such a 
motive to adapt accounting techniques that show 
the profit with lower value. With such a behavior, 
they try to reduce the possibility of political mea-
sures against the enterprise and thus to lower the 
expected political costs. 
Attraction of capital 
The more stable profit an enterprise has, the 
more demands exist for corporative bonds and se-
curities and as a result value of corporative stocks 
increases and risk for investment in the enterprise 
will reduce. 
Earnings management researches approaches 
Mac Nichols (2004) refers to three approaches 
for earnings management researches in accounting 
literature. First, in those studies which are based 
on a group of accrual items where they have often 
used John’s model. Secondly, the researches based 
on certain accrual items that examine one or more 
accrued items, and the third one that is research 
approach based on distribution of profits (equi-
ties) after their management in which earnings are 
evaluated at three thresholds of zero level, equity of 
previous year, and expectations of analysts from the 
profit in current year as any evidences for earnings 
management. 
The review of this literature based on earnings 
management denotes the presence of different ap-
proaches toward measurement of earnings manage-
ment. One of these foremost approaches based on 
discretionary accruals is a parameter for determi-
nation and revealing earnings management in com-
mercial units. As rate of discretionary accruals in-
creases, the possibility for arbitrary (opportunistic) 
behaviors by management increases and it is a sign 
of low reliability on profit(Modares et al, 2009).      
Accounting profit may be divided into two ele-
ments i.e. cash and accruals. The accrual items are 
a general terms including both accrual and defer-
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ral accounting items. In some research texts, the 
accrual items have been classified into types: dis-
cretionary accruals (or abnormal) and non- discre-
tionary accruals (normal). In any case, discretion-
ary accruals serve as appropriate tools for earnings 
management. In research literature, earnings man-
agement is accruals from earnings spread (net prof-
it) and resultant cash flows from operation. The 
expectable (normal) levels of accruals, which are 
approximated based on investors’ available infor-
mation under normal conditions, called discre-
tionary accrued items. Discretionary accruals are 
the product of subtracting the approximated non- 
discretionary accruals from total discretionary ac-
crued item. 
Investment effi ciency 
Investment efficiency conceptually means ac-
ceptance of projects with positive current net value 
and investment inefficiency denotes passing through 
these investment opportunities (under- investment) 
and or selection of projects with negative current net 
value (over- investment)( Saghafi,  and  Arab Mazar 
Yazdi, 2010). 
As usual, an investment efficient policy is defined 
as all investment projects with recoverable positive 
net value that will result in entering future cash fund 
into a commercial unit and therefore these projects 
should be accepted. All projects with negative recov-
erable net value will cause future cash flow to exist so 
these projects should be rejected(Lara et al, 2009). 
One commercial unit is defined as efficient in 
investment when it selects all projects with positive 
current net value. Thus, under some circumstance 
when there is no friction like incompatible selection 
or agency costs; inefficient investment is to dispense 
with investment opportunities with positive current 
net value (under- investment). Furthermore, ineffi-
cient investment comprises of projects with negative 
current net value (over- investment) as well(Modares 
and Hesarzadeh, 2008). 
Several persons usually involve in decisions on 
investment like corporative financial managers and 
capital providers etc; if financial results are not sin-
cerely and properly reported and the enterprise im-
plements earnings management, in order to achieve 
market expectations, both investment parties exe-
cute over- investment. As a result, manipulation of 
profit by enterprise may affect corporative interior 
decision making and lead to inappropriate and in-
efficient decisions for investment(Mac Nichols and 
Stubben, 2008). 
Earnings management may affect on invest-
ment efficiency in several ways including as follows: 
1) Investment decisions depend on expectation 
from investment benefits and this in turn affects on 
growth and demands for corporative products. Also 
expectations from corporative growth are based on 
some information like income and profit. Improper 
presentation of financial performance may disrupt 
trend of revenues and profits. Therefore, earnings 
management may lead to distortion of expectations 
from corporative growth. Pursuant to this trend, 
decision makers of the enterprise in the field of in-
vestment may tend to over- investment because of 
lack of knowledge about the corporative growth real 
trend and its real profit(Lenard and Yu, 2012).  
Thus, if the financial results are not sincerely 
reported and the enterprise tends to earnings man-
agement then in order to achieve capital market ex-
pectation, investor parties may implement over- in-
vestment. As a result, manipulation of corporative 
profit may affect on corporative interior decisions 
and this leads to make adverse and inefficient in-
vestment decisions(Nichols and Stubben, 2008) . 
2) According to theoretical bases of agency 
theory, managers always tend to maximize their 
own interests and this causes that these interests 
are sometime in conflict with the interests of ben-
eficiaries outside the enterprises like shareholders 
and loaners. The existing potential conflict among 
management, ownership, and loaners may affect on 
investment structure, corporative governance, and 
investment policies of the enterprise and it leads to 
increasing in making inefficient decisions by man-
agement instead of selection of projects with posi-
tive current net value, management chooses some 
projects that reduce corporative value (project with 
negative current net value) and exposes the en-
terprises with challenge of improper selection of 
projects(Saghafi and  Arab Mazar Yazdi, 2010). 
3) On the other hand, those enterprises which 
execute earnings management may provide finan-
cially at lower rate and this also in turn affects on 
decisions for investment by enterprises. 
So far few researches have been carried out re-
garding the impact of earnings management invest-
ment decisions so in this section we refer to some 
of them: 
Linck et al (2013) conducted a study under ti-
tle of “whether manager use discretionary accru-
als when they are exposed to financial restrictions”. 
Hypotheses of that study included this point that 
those companies which are exposed to financial 
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constraint may adapt discretionary accruals as a 
tool to show future positive outlook that enables 
them to increase capital and to invest again from 
the acquired capital. They found that the enterpris-
es, which are exposed to financial limitation and at 
the same time they posses good opportunities for in-
vestment, have discretionary accruals at higher lev-
el than other corporations. As a result, they can at-
tract more capital and take measure for investment. 
If an enterprise invests appropriately then corpora-
tive performance will improve otherwise the given 
enterprise will not have efficient investments(Linck 
and Tao, 2010). 
In an investigation, Lenard and Yu (2012) ex-
plored the impact of earnings and quality manage-
ment in accounting over- investment. They em-
ployed discretionary accruals as a parameter for 
earnings management. Their results indicated that 
earnings management affects on investment and 
discretionary accruals are an important parameter 
for over- investment(Lenard and Yu , 2012). 
Cohn and Zarowin (2009), in a survey, reviewed 
the relationship among earnings management (real 
earnings management and discretionary accruals 
earnings management) and over- investment. They 
found that over- investment exists both in those en-
terprises which are involved in real earnings man-
agement and those ones that tend to earnings man-
agement of discretionary accruals; but the results 
showed that real earnings management affects 
more adversely on corporative investments(Cohen 
and Zarowin, 2009) . 
In another study, Mac Nichols and Stubben 
(2008) examined the effect of earnings manage-
ment on corporative investment decisions. They 
adapted investing in fixed assets as a parameter for 
investment. Their results showed that the enter-
prises, which implement earnings management in 
comparison with other firms and during several pe-
riods, may execute over- investment. Similarly, re-
sults of their research indicated that presentation of 
proper information might lead to making efficient 
decisions in the enterprise. 
Wang (2006) also found that those enterprises, 
which implement earnings management, might ex-
ecute over- investment in Research and Develop-
ment (R&D) activities, merging, and acquisition of 
over- investment(Lenard and Yu, 2012) . 
In another survey under title of economy of 
fraudulent accounting, Kedia and Philippon (2006) 
purposed that earnings management fraudulent ac-
counting might be followed by important economic 
consequences. They concluded that the enterprises 
with lower productivity (efficiency) might tend to 
over- investment in order the present a better image 
of their financial and economic status. This mea-
sure may distort the allocation of economic sources 
in economy. Likewise, they found that enterprises 
might execute over- investment during the peri-
ods when they tended to earnings management and 
when fraudulent financial reporting is disclosed 
they withdraw extra capital from the enterprise so 
their efficiency is improved(Kedia and Philippon, 
2006).  
In their research, Maureen et al (2005) exam-
ined this question that does earnings management 
affect on corporative investment decisions? Their 
findings showed that over- investment was appro-
priate during the period when improper reports 
have been presented but over- investment has been 
reduced at next periods(Linck et al, 2010). 
In Iran, in a survey conducted by Modares and 
Mohammadi (2009), they investigated into the im-
pact of earnings management on investment deci-
sions made by the admitted enterprises in Tehran 
Security and Exchange Organization (TSEO) dur-
ing 2001-5. By means of Eckel’s index in enterpris-
es, they divided them into two groups of profit ma-
nipulating and non- manipulating of profit. Results 
of this survey showed that profit manipulating en-
terprises had not the expectable higher investment 
level than investment opportunity during period of 
profit manipulation. Similarly, at the next finan-
cial period, these enterprises have not also expect-
ed the lower investment level than the investment 
opportunities(Modares and Mohammadi, 2009). 
Conclusions
The conducted researches in the field of earn-
ings management indicate that few studies have 
been carried out concerning to the impact of earn-
ings management on investment efficiency. Results 
of these studies show that earnings management af-
fects on investment decisions made by enterprises 
and leads to making inefficient and inappropriate 
decisions.  
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